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Abstract This chapter describes the implication and lessons from reactor design 
and operation points of view. After introduction of safety principles and safety 
designs of LWRs, lessons of the accident, new regulatory requirements and 
improvements in Japan, essential technologies for preventing and mitigating 
severe accidents are described.
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12.1  Short Reflection of Basic Safety Issues
In contrary to other technologies, for nuclear facilities, the basic safety rules have 
been introduced from the very beginning. In addition, the safety requirements and 
designs especially of LWRs have been improved from the lessons of accidents and 
incidents that occurred during the history of this technology.
In order to assure the function of the four classical safety barriers—fuel matrix, 
fuel rod, primary circuit and containment—the defense-in-depth safety concept is 
applied. The strategy for defense-in-depth is twofold:
•	 to prevent accidents, and
•	 if prevention fails, to limit their potential consequences and prevent any evolution 
to more serious conditions.
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The fundamental safety goals that shall be achieved with the support of the provisions 
taken within the framework of the defense-in-depth concept are: control of reactivity, 
cooling of fuel elements, and activity retention.
The safety goal “reactivity control” means among others that a nuclear reactor 
should have inherent safety characteristics. The reactor should be designed to have 
negative reactivity feedback characteristics. The power coefficient of the reactor 
should be negative for automatic decrease without operator actions. The reactivity 
coefficients of fuel temperature and coolant voiding should be kept negative for 
the purpose. After a reactor trip it should be kept in a sub-critical state in the long 
term and sub-criticality should be ensured during handling, storage and transport 
of fuel elements.
The safety goal, “cooling of fuel elements,” means to ensure heat removal from 
the core and the fuel storage pool under all operating and accident conditions and 
replenishing of coolant for the core and the fuel storage pool. In addition the integ-
rity of coolant retaining systems should be ensured by pressure and temperature 
limitation in the relevant safety components and systems.
The safety function, “activity retention,” should be provided by means of isola-
tion provisions with the function of confinement of activity within the pressure-
retaining boundary and connecting systems. An important activity confinement 
function is dedicated to the containment and other relevant buildings such as the 
reactor and the auxiliary building.
According to the IAEA document INSAG 10 [1], five levels of defense should 
be considered. The levels 1–3 define the design basis. Levels 4 and 5 define the 
beyond design basis area. An overview on the levels and the main means of action 
is depicted in Table 12.1.
Level 1
The safety provisions at Level 1 are taken through the choice of site, design, manufac-
turing, construction, commissioning, operating and maintenance requirements such as:
Table 12.1  The levels and the main means of action for the defense-in-depth safety concept in 
INSAG 10 [1]
Level Goal Main means of action
1 Prevention of abnormal operation  
and failures
Conservative design and high quality  
in construction and operation
2 Control of abnormal operation  
and failures
Control, limiting and protection  
systems and other surveillance features
3 Control of accidents within  
the design basis
Engineered safety features and accident 
procedures
4 Control of severe conditions including  
prevention of accident progression  
and mitigation of the consequences  
of a severe accident
Complementary measures and accident 
management
5 Mitigation of the radiological consequences 
of significant external releases of radioactive 
material
Offsite emergency response
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•	 The clear definition of normal and abnormal operating conditions;
•	 Adequate margins in the design of systems and plant components, including 
robustness and resistance to accident conditions, in particular aimed at minimizing 
the need to take measures at Level 2 and Level 3;
•	 Adequate time for operators to respond to events and appropriate human-
machine interfaces, including operator aids, to reduce burden on the operators;
•	 Careful selection of materials and use of qualified fabrication processes and 
proven technology together with extensive testing;
•	 Comprehensive training of appropriately selected operating personnel whose 
behavior is consistent with a sound safety culture;
•	 Adequate operating instructions and reliable monitoring of plant status and 
operating conditions;
•	 Recording, evaluation and utilization of operating experience;
•	 Comprehensive preventive maintenance prioritized in accordance with the 
safety significance and reliability requirements of systems.
Furthermore, Level 1 provides the initial basis for protection against external and 
internal hazards (e.g. earthquakes, aircraft crashes, blast waves, fire, flooding), even 
though some additional protection may be required at higher levels of defense.
Level 2
Level 2 incorporates inherent plant features, such as core stability and thermal inertia, 
and systems to control abnormal operation (anticipated operational occurrences), tak-
ing into account phenomena capable of causing further deterioration in the plant status. 
The systems to mitigate the consequences of such operating occurrences are designed 
according to specific criteria (such as redundancy, layout and qualification). The objec-
tive is to bring the plant back to normal operating conditions as soon as possible.
Diagnostic tools and equipment such as automatic control systems can be pro-
vided to actuate corrective actions before reactor protection limits are reached; exam-
ples are power operated relief valves, automatic limitation systems on reactor power 
and on coolant pressure, temperature or level, and process control function systems 
which record and announce faults in the control room. On-going surveillance of 
quality and compliance with the design assumptions by means of in-service inspec-
tion and periodic testing of systems and plant components is also necessary to detect 
any degradation of equipment and systems before it can affect the safety of the plant.
Level 3
Engineered safety features and protection systems are provided to prevent evolution 
towards severe accidents and also to confine radioactive materials within the con-
tainment system. Active and passive engineered safety systems are used. In the short 
term, safety systems are actuated by the reactor protection system when needed.
To ensure a high reliability of the engineered safety systems, the following 
design principles are adhered to:
•	 Redundancy;
•	 Prevention of common mode failure due to internal or external hazards, by 
physical or spatial separation and structural protection;
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•	 Prevention of common mode failure due to design, manufacturing, construction, 
commissioning, maintenance or other human intervention, by diversity or func-
tional redundancy;
•	 Automation to reduce vulnerability to human failure, at least in the initial phase 
of an incident or an accident;
•	 Testability to provide clear evidence of system availability and performance;
•	 Qualification of systems, components and structures for specific environmental 
conditions that may result from an accident or an external hazard
Level 4
The broad aim of the fourth level of defense is to ensure that the likelihood of an 
accident entailing severe core damage, and the magnitude of radioactive releases 
in the unlikely event that a severe plant condition occurs, are both kept as low as 
reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Such plant conditions may be caused by multiple failures, such as the complete 
loss of all trains of a safety system, or by an extremely unlikely event such as a 
severe flood.
Measures for accident management are also aimed at controlling the course of 
severe accidents and mitigating their consequences.
Essential objectives of accident management are:
•	 to monitor the main characteristics of plant status;
•	 to control core sub-criticality;
•	 to restore heat removal from the core and maintain long term core cooling;
•	 to protect the integrity of the containment by ensuring heat removal and pre-
venting dangerous loads on the containment in the event of severe core damage 
or further accident progression;
•	 regaining control of the plant if possible and, if degradation cannot be stopped, 
delaying further plant deterioration and implementing on-site and off-site emer-
gency response.
The most important objective for mitigation of the consequences of an accident in 
Level 4 is the protection of the confinement.
Specific measures for accident management are established on the basis of 
safety studies and research results. These measures fully utilize existing plant 
capabilities, including available non-safety-related equipment.
Measures for accident management can also include hardware changes. 
Examples are the installation of filtered containment venting systems and the 
inerting of the containment in boiling water reactors in order to prevent hydrogen 
burning in severe accident conditions.
Adequate staff preparation and training for such conditions is a prerequisite for 
effective accident management.
Level 5
Off-site emergency procedures are prepared in consultation with the operating 
organization and the authorities in charge and must comply with international 
agreements.
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Both on-site and off-site emergency plans are exercised periodically to the 
extent necessary to ensure the readiness of the organizations involved.
Safety Culture
The idea of safety culture should be an inherent understanding of any organization 
in the international nuclear industry, which is focused on safety. For better under-
standing two definitions may serve.
INSAG-4 definition: Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and 
attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that as an overrid-
ing priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance.
NRC definition: A good safety culture in a nuclear installation is a reflection of 
the values, which are shared throughout all levels of the organization and which are 
based on the belief that safety is important and that it is everyone’s responsibility.
12.2  Lessons Learned and Recommendations Derived
The overview of the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station (NPS) 
accident is depicted in Fig. 12.1 [also see Chap. 2 in this volume—eds.]. The 
essential lessons from the accident are described in [2]. The lessons learned con-
cerning the reactor design and operation states of view and the recommendations 
dedicated thereof are described in this section.
Fig. 12.1  Lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station accident [3]
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12.2.1  Natural Hazards
Lessons
The accident was caused by the big tsunami. It flooded the reactor and turbine 
buildings. The emergency diesel generators (DGs) lost their function and all AC 
power supply was lost. The loss of function of the emergency diesel generators 
were caused by flooding of power supply panels and diesel generators themselves 
as well as loss of heat sink of the DG cooling by the flooding of sea water pumps.
The anti-seismic design of the plant worked well by the improvements after the 
big earthquakes in Kobe and Chūetsu-oki. The movements of multiple regions in 
the seabed caused the big earthquake of March 11, 2011. The acceleration on the 
base mat of the reactor building is, however, predicted well by the standard accel-
eration for safety grade system.
The safety systems did not lose function by the earthquake. The height of the 
tsunami was, however, underestimated. It is the most important direct reason for 
the initiation and progression of the accident. The tsunami was caused by the 
slides along the boundary of continental plates. The interaction of tsunami waves 
from multiple origins appears to make the waves high.
Recommendation
It is necessary to develop imagination of natural hazards and its combinations that 
may potentially cause severe accidents. For example, big hurricanes and typhoons 
cause extreme high tides that floods large area. The combination of external fires, 
tsunami and earthquakes may cause difficulty in the availability of the emer-
gency power supply, cooling water and accessibility of the plants.
12.2.2  Emergency Power Supply
Lessons
The external power of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi plants was lost by the fail-
ure of transmission lines by the earthquake. The emergency DGs and some batter-
ies were flooded. Both AC and DC power were lost. The capacity of the remaining 
batteries was exhausted. The safety systems and instrumentation systems lost their 
functions. Units 5 and 6 of the site survived with the electricity from an air-cooled 
emergency DG. The loss of DC power caused difficulty for the operators to know 
the condition of the plants and conduct timely actions.
Recommendation
It is necessary to enhance the reliability of both AC and DC power supply 
against external events and provide sufficient power in case of severe accidents. 
In case that they are lost, alternative power supplies need to be provided for the 
plant.
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12.2.3  Loss of Heat Sink
Lessons
Loss of ultimate heat sink is the important lesson of the accident as well as loss 
of emergency power. Damage of seawater pumps by the tsunami caused  multiple 
failures of functioning of pumps and heat exchangers needed for cooling and 
dumping heat into the sea.
Recommendation
Provision of protective measures such as bunkering of important components and/
or alternative cooling devices as well as the water source is necessary.
12.2.4  Hydrogen Detonation
Lessons
The reactor building of Units 1, 3 and 4 were destroyed by hydrogen detonation. 
The building of unit 2 was not destroyed, because the blow- out panel of the reac-
tor building dropped down by the detonation of Unit 1. The hydrogen detonation 
of Unit 1 building scattered the debris on the site and made preparation of securing 
activities for Units 2 and 3 difficult.
The primary containment vessels (PCVs) were inerted by nitrogen. Recombiners of 
hydrogen were equipped. The temperature and pressure of PCVs became high above 
the design conditions. The leakage of hydrogen from PCVs occurred at the penetra-
tions and the gasket seals of the flange. It accumulated within the reactor buildings. 
Venting of PCVs caused hydrogen leakage to the piping connected to the stack.
The detonation of the reactor building of Unit 4 was thought to be caused by the 
leakage through the piping of stand-by gas treatment system (SGTS) connected to 
the common stack. The air operated valve of the SGTS piping failed open by the loss 
of power as well as the loss of air driving the valve as the backup. It caused the leak-
age of hydrogen from Unit 3 to Unit 4 that was not in operation at the accident [2].
Recommendation
The provision against hydrogen leakage at severe accidents should be elaborated 
and the respective measures should be performed.
12.2.5  Measurement at Severe Accidents
Lessons
Important reactor parameters such as water level, pressure and temperature could 
not be measured due to the loss of DC power after the tsunami. The water level, 
the most important safety parameter of LWRs was measured erroneously after 
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core melt down because of the change of the reference water level by evapora-
tion due to the high containment temperature. It erroneously showed that the 
water level existed in the middle of the core. The wrong information confused the 
actions and harmed the reliability of the TEPCO information to the public. Mental 
bias of the specialists hoping the survival of the plants also decreased the reliabil-
ity. It should be noted that the water level monitor did not work well at TMI-2.
Habitability of the main control room (MCR) was deteriorated at the accident. The 
air ventilation system of the MCR with charcoal filters lost the function.
Recommendation
Important reactor parameters as well as radiation level, radioactivity and hydrogen 
concentration in PCV need to be measured for management of severe accidents.
12.2.6  Management of Severe Accident
Lessons
The employees and workers at site had to conduct accident managements under 
extreme circumstances such as darkness, high radiation, loss of reactor monitoring 
and communication ability, scattered debris by earthquake, tsunami, and hydrogen 
explosions. Working under such conditions was not prepared at all. The command 
of TEPCO headquarters also suffered from difficulty in understanding the situa-
tions and making decisions.
The containment venting procedure is written in the manual that the director of the 
plant orders it. But it was negotiated with the central government and took time 
to be conducted. The seawater injection was halted by the order of the TEPCO 
headquarter, but it was continued by the decision of the plant director. There was 
confusion of command.
Recommendation
There should be a clear definition of information, decision responsibility and 
actions dedicated to the organizations involved during the management process in 
case of extreme situations or a severe accident.
12.3  Recommendations and Requirements Derived 
from Lessons Learned
All important organizations which are engaged in nuclear safety regulation have 
analyzed the Fukushima accident and have identified lessons learned and proposed 
recommendations which evolved from these lessons. These bodies were, for exam-
ple, IAEA, NRC, ENSREG, ANS and Japanese organizations such as AESJ.
New regulatory requirements for commercial light water nuclear power plants were 
developed in Japan in July 2013, taking into account the lessons learned from the acci-
dent at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station [3]. Major improvements include:
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•	 Enforcement of resistance against earthquake and tsunami,
•	 Reliability of power supply,
•	 Measures to prevent core damage by postulating multiple failures,
•	 Measures to prevent failure of containment vessel,
•	 Measures to suppress radioactive material dispersion,
•	 Strengthen command communication and instrumentation,
•	 Consideration of natural phenomena in addition to earthquakes and tsunamis, 
for example volcanic eruptions, tornadoes and forest fires,
•	 Response to intentional aircraft crashes,
•	 Consideration of internal flooding, and
•	 Fire protection
These improvements are specifically required to be installed within the current 
Japanese reactor fleet as basic requirement for an allowance of further operation.
12.4  Examples for Potential Countermeasures  
and/or Technologies to be Applied
On basis of the identified lessons and countermeasures, some examples are 
described in more detail in the following sections of this chapter. There are three 
main areas selected as follows:
•	 External events,
•	 Design of buildings, systems and components, and
•	 Severe accident issues
12.4.1  External Events
There are some common countermeasures proposed for all external events which 
are considered to be generally applied for all extreme external events as follows:
•	 Develop an approach to regulate hazards from extreme natural phenomena;
•	 Periodically redefine and re-analyze the natural event design basis.
Since external events in most cases lead to a combination of initiating events 
such as earthquake and tsunami or earthquake and fire, such combined effects 
have to be systematically considered in the design. One proposal which could be 
considered as a good approach is recommended by Sustainable Nuclear Energy 
Technology Platform (SNETP) [4] as follows:
•	 Extending even further the in-depth safety approach to any type of hazards, in 
particular external ones, and accounting for any mode of combination of them;
•	 Systematically include the design extension conditions (beyond design basis 
accidents) in the defense-in-depth approach at the design stage.
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According to SNETP, there is also the need for future studies and development in 
the following area:
•	 Development of approaches to natural hazard definition, techniques and data, 
and development of guidance on natural hazards assessments, including earth-
quake, flooding and extreme weather conditions;
•	 Development of guidance on the assessment of margins beyond the design basis 
and cliff-edge effects for extreme natural hazards;
•	 Development of a systematic approach to extreme weather challenges and a 
more consistent understanding of the possible design mitigation measures;
•	 Development of the approach for assessment of the secondary effects of natural 
hazards, such as flood or fires arising as a result of seismic events;
•	 Enhancement of probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) for natural hazards other 
than seismic (in particular extreme weather) and development of methods to 
determine margins and identify potential plant improvements;
•	 Overall enhancement of PSA analysis, covering all plant states, external events 
and prolonged processes, for PSA levels 1 and 2.
12.4.1.1  Earthquake
It is proposed from several organizations to increase the seismic design criteria 
for the evaluation and assessment of beyond design external events. There are 
some proposals available, such as those from Ref. [5], to increase the seismic 
design criteria to 1 degree of magnitude e.g. 0.2–0.3 g. Yet, there is no final deci-
sion that can be commonly agreed upon within the nuclear community. This is 
one of the tasks that have to be worked on by the respective organizations in the 
future.
It is now common understanding that a periodically redefinition and re-analysis 
of the earthquake design basis should be performed in the future. The regulatory 
basis has to be provided by the respective organizations.
In Japan, Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) strengthened the examina-
tion of active faults. Seismic design needs to take into account of the faults that 
was active after 126,000 years ago (Late Pleistocene). If necessary, activity of 
the faults is examined up to 400,000 years ago. The ground acceleration should 
be determined taking the three-dimensional underground structures, which may 
amplify the acceleration. The safety-class structures and buildings should not be 
built on the active faults. The ground acceleration increases with the length of 
active faults. The length of faults needs to be determined including the exami-
nation of nearby seabed. Big earthquakes such as the movement between conti-
nental plates also need to be considered separately. The basic earthquake ground 
motion is determined from these points. It changes with the site of the nuclear 
power plants. Strengthening the seismic design of the plants is conducted after the 
approval of NRA.
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12.4.1.2  Tsunami
The common countermeasures described above are also proposed for tsunami 
events.
As an example the standards set by the Japanese NRA define a “Design Basis 
Tsunami” as one that exceeds the largest ever recorded. It requires protective 
measures such as seawalls. The standards also require “structure, systems and 
components (SSCs)” for tsunami protective measures to be classified as class S, 
the highest seismic safety classification to ensure that they continue to prevent 
inundations even during earthquakes.
The examples of multi-layered protection measures against tsunami are 
installation of a seawall to prevent site inundation and installation of water-tight 
doors to prevent the flooding of buildings. An example for a seawall is shown in 
Fig. 12.2.
12.4.2  Design of Buildings, Systems and Components
12.4.2.1  Sites with More Than One Reactor
In case of multiple-unit sites, the following measures have to be considered:
•	 Strict separation of safety related systems and components, and
•	 Provision of a plant arrangement which prevents common cause failures for 
safety related systems and components,
There is no specific technology required; the design is related to well-known tech-
nologies that have to fulfill the specific design requirements.
The PSA should be the tool that enables identification of the areas that must be 
considered to strengthen the safety of multi-unit sites.
Fig. 12.2  Installation 
of a seawall to prevent site 
inundation [3]
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12.4.2.2  Off-Site and On-Site Electricity Supply
In case of an external event like an earthquake, the off-site electricity supply is very dif-
ficult or even impossible to maintain. This results not only from the direct effect on the 
grid structure like masts and cables, but also from the fact that other plants which feed 
into the grid may also be affected and consequently have to be shut down. Nevertheless, 
it should be evaluated whether it is possible to enforce the grid design, which may 
result in a higher chance for survivability of parts of the off-site grid connection.
Since the large uncertainty exists for the maintainability of the off-site grid in case 
of an earthquake, the way to substitute off-site electricity supply is mainly to provide 
mobile power supply systems or addition of diesel generators or other power sources 
such as gas turbines. These components must be protected against external events by 
bunkering or locating at positions which cannot be affected by e.g. tsunami waves.
NRA requirements for existing Japanese plants
In order to prevent common cause failures due to events other than natural phenom-
ena, the measure against power failures is strengthened. For off-site power, inde-
pendence of two circuits was not required before, but is required. For on-site AC 
power source, two permanently installed units, two more mobile units and storage 
of fuel for seven days are required. For on-site DC power source, one permanently 
installed system with a capacity for 30 min was required before, but increase of the 
capacity to 24 h duration and addition of one mobile system and one permanently 
installed system both with 24 h duration are required. Additionally, it is required 
that switchboards and other equipment should not lose their operational capabilities.
Loss of power supply and 3rd grid connection
To ensure that operational and safety-related components maintain their AC supply, 
in Germany nuclear power plants are forced to use a tiered back-up system: the main 
grid connection, the stand-by grid connection, the emergency power supply (ordi-
nary back-up AC power source), and the emergency feed power supply (diverse AC 
power source). The different stages of the AC power supply allow it to cover differ-
ent failures of the AC grid. An additional third grid connection is also available [6].
Robustness of emergency power supply
The measures to enforce the on-site power supply are in general the protection of 
the existing components against external events, to extend the capacity and timely 
availability, and provide diverse components.
In case of the Olkiluoto 3 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) [7] the reactor plant 
electrical power system is divided into four parallel and physically separated sub-
divisions designed against external events. The power supply to equipment criti-
cal for safety of each division is backed up with a 7.8 MVA diesel generator. The 
Olkiluoto gas turbine plant can also supply the bus bars of the diesel generators. 
In case of the loss of all external power supplies, the malfunction of all four die-
sel generators at once, i.e. the complete loss of all AC power, the plant unit has 
two smaller diesel generators with an output of approximately 3 MVA each. These 
units are bunkered and can ensure power supply to safety-critical systems even in 
such a highly exceptional situation.
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Another example is the “SUSAN” system of the Muehleberg NPP in Switzerland 
[8]. “SUSAN” is an acronym for “Spezielles Unabhängiges System zur Abführung 
der Nachzerfallswärme,” which means a special independent residual heat removal 
system. The main tasks are (1) to remove residual heat from the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) in the long term, (2) fast shutdown and isolation of the reactor and (3) 
limit and reduce the primary circuit pressure. The system is designed to resist design 
earthquake, protection against sabotage, flooding and airplane crash. The main sys-
tem parts and equipment of SUSAN are located in a dedicated building, which is 
protected against impact from outside. Two 100 % emergency diesel generators are 
used to supply necessary pumps and systems with power in case of station blackout.
12.4.2.3  Bunkering of Buildings with Safety Related Systems
Emergency Feed Building
Recent German PWRs are equipped with a second four-fold emergency power supply 
(emergency diesel sets) [9]. These second emergency cooling systems can cool the 
reactor core (via steam generators) as well as the spent fuel pool (via auxiliary emer-
gency cooling chain or emergency systems). Emergency diesel sets are equipped with 
diesel and water reserves conservatively lasting for at least 10 h and more. Emergency 
buildings (similar to regular emergency diesel housings) are also designed according 
to design basis regulations including flooding. A building arrangement of a typical 
emergency feed building is shown in Fig. 12.3. Air ventilation shafts and air suction 
holes are located in the upper part of the building, indicated by the circles in Fig. 12.3.
The emergency feed building is designed for airplane crash, explosion pressure 
wave, flooding, explosive gases, and earthquake, and is located separately from 
other buildings of the plant. It encloses the following:
1. Four additional EDGs (so called D2 Diesels): They serve for power supply in 
case of loss of offsite power (LOOP) and unavailability of the four main EDGs 
(D1 Diesels).
Fig. 12.3  Bunkered emergency feed building for recent German PWRs. The circles indicate air 
ventilation shafts and air suction holes located in the upper part of the building
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2. Four trains of emergency feed water pumps: Directly driven by the D2 Diesels 
(but can also be power supplied by the D1 Diesels, if available): An emergency 
control room (RSS), including wash room, toilet, plant documentation.
3. Safety related instrumentation and control (I&C).
4. Safety related switchgears.
5. Dedicated heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) system (also powered 
by D2 Diesel).
6. Mobile equipment for secondary side bleed and feed.
Robustness of Cooling Chain in BWRs and PWRs
An example for the implementation of an additional cooling system and therefore 
for the robustness of the cooling chain of a BWR is described in the Stress test 
Report for German nuclear power plants [6].
An additional independent residual heat removal (RHR) system was installed in 
separated new building for Philipsburg 1 NPP, Brunsbuettel NPP both in Germany, 
Oskarshamm 1&2 NPP in Sweden, and Muehleberg NPP in Switzerland.
It serves as an independent heat sink for residual heat removal and power sup-
ply by diesels including cooling of the independent diesels in a separated new 
building. It is also possible to diversify, for example, by air-cooled cell cooling 
towers, wells etc. As another example, the ZUNA system of Gundremmingen 1&2 
NPP may serve. This is a retrofitted, independent, additional residual heat removal 
and feed water system with a diverse heat sink by means of wet well cooling tow-
ers and diverse emergency power diesels (station blackout diesels). The ZUNA 
system is protected against external and internal events.
An example for the robustness of a fuel pool cooling system is the wet stor-
age of spent fuel pool of Goesgen NPP in Switzerland [10]. The cooling during 
normal operation is provided by natural circulation. The temperature of the pool 
is 45 °C maximum with support of fans in case of high outside temperature and 
fully loaded fuel pool. The cooling in case of accidents is provided by natural cir-
culation without need of electrical supply. The temperature of the spent fuel pool 
depends on the type of accident, but up to max 80 °C.
12.4.2.4  Passive Components and Systems Using Natural Forces
Passive components do not need external power since they rely on laws of physics 
such as gravity, heat transfer by temperature difference or pressure increase though 
heating of enclosed fluids.
Isolation Condenser
Isolation condenser (IC) is a passive system of BWRs for emergency cooling 
located above containment in a pool of water open to atmosphere. The scheme is 
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shown in Fig. 12.4 [11, 12]. Under normal condition IC system is not activated, 
but the top of the IC is connected to the reactor’s steam lines through an open 
valve. Steam enters the IC until it is filled with water. When the IC system is acti-
vated, a valve at the bottom of the IC is opened which connects to a lower area 
on the reactor. The water flows to the reactor via gravity, allowing the condenser 
to fill with steam, which then condenses. This cycle runs continuously until bot-
tom valve is closed. In case of electricity failure, the valve closes automatically 
and operators have to open them manually. Fail-open valves and lines need to be 
installed for severe accidents.
Gravity Driven Cooling System
The gravity-driven cooling system (GDCS) injects water to the RPV by gravity. 
The GDCS pool locates at higher elevation than the RPV. Squib valves from the 
DC safety related power from batteries activate the system. The schematic dia-
gram of ESBWR GDCS is provided in [11, 12].
Passive Containment Cooling System
Passive containment cooling system (PCCS) of ESBWR consists of a set of heat 
exchangers located in the upper portion of the reactor building. The steam from the 
Fig. 12.4  Isolation condenser [11, 12]
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reactor flows through the containment to the PCCS heat exchangers where the steam 
is condensed. The condensate drains backs from the PCCS heat exchangers where 
the steam is condensed to the GDCS pools. For more detail, refer to [11, 12].
The passive safety systems of ESBWR are discussed in [11, 12]. In the events 
where the reactor pressure boundary remains intact, the isolation condenser 
system(IC) is used to remove decay heat from the reactor to transfer it outside 
containment. In the events where the reactor pressure boundary does not remain 
intact and water inventory in the core is lost, the PCCS and GDCS work in concert 
to maintain the water level in the core and remove decay heat from the reactor and 
transferring it outside containment. When the water level of the RPV drops to a 
predetermined level, the reactor is depressurized and the GDCS is initiated. Both 
IC and PCCS heat exchangers are submerged in a pool of water large enough to 
provide 72 h of reactor decay heat removal capability. The pool is vented to the 
atmosphere. It is located outside of the containment. It will be refilled easily with 
low-pressure water sources via pre-installed piping.
Emergency Condenser
Emergency condensers (ECs) are used for residual heat removal from the RPV. 
The residual heat is released into the core flooding pool inside the containment, 
not outside of it as the isolation condenser. The schematic drawing of the ECs 
is shown in Fig. 12.5 [13]. Each of the four ECs consists of a steam line (to 
connection) leading from an RPV nozzle, and a condensate return line (lower 
connection) back to the RPV. Each return line is equipped with an anti-circula-
tion loop. The ECs are connected to the RPV without any isolating element and 
Fig. 12.5  Emergency condenser [13]
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are actuated by a drop of the RPV water level. In the event of water level drop 
in the RPV, steam from the RPV enters the heat exchanger tubes of the ECs, 
located in the core flooding pools and condense inside the pipe. The condensate 
returns back into the RPV. This system assures core cooling even at high RPV 
pressure.
The ECs are used for the KERENATM (formerly SWR-1000) reactor, an 
advanced BWR in Germany. The cross section of the KERENATM reactor contain-
ment is shown in Fig. 12.6 [13]. Shielding/Storage pool is on top of the contain-
ment. It is used as a heat sink to remove the heat from the containment. The water 
inventory is sufficient to ensure passive heat removal for at least 3 days.
Fig. 12.6  Section through the KERENA reactor containment [13]
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Containment Cooling Condenser
In case the ECs are in operation or when the safety relief valves are opened in 
case of LOCA, the water of the core flooding pool starts to evaporate and the pres-
sure in the containment will increase. Containment cooling condensers (CCC) are 
installed above the core flooding pools as seen in Fig. 12.7.
The heat exchanger tubes are slightly inclined. Both inlet and discharge lines 
are connected to the shielding/storage pool and are open during normal opera-
tion. When the temperature increases inside the containment, the water in the CCC 
starts to heat up so that a natural circulation flow establishes in the system.
Passive Pressure Pulse Transmitter
The passive pressure pulse transmitters (PPPT) function without electric power 
supply, external media, or actuation via I&C signals. The PPPTs serve to initiate 
scram, containment isolation of main steam lines, and automatic depressurization 
of the RPV. The PPPT consists of a small heat exchanger connected to the RPV 
via a non-isolatable pipe, as shown in Fig. 12.8.
The secondary side of the heat exchangers is connected to a diaphragm pilot valve 
via a pipe. During normal operation the PPPTs are filled with water. In case of water 
level drop inside the RPV, the water level in the tube of the PPPTs drops as well. 
When the primary side of the heat exchanger is filled with steam it will condense and 
drains back into the RPV while in the secondary side of the heat exchanger the tem-
perature rises until the water starts to evaporate. The design of the heat exchanger is 
such that the activation of the systems is done in the required time. By means of the 
increased pressure, a function is triggered via the diaphragm pilot valve.
Fig. 12.7  Containment 
cooling condenser [13]
24112 Implications and Lessons for Advanced Reactor Design …
Passive Residual Heat Removal System
The passive residual heat removal system (PRHR) of advanced PWR, AP1000TM 
provides reactor cooling by natural circulation through the core as shown in 
Fig. 12.9 [14].
The heat exchanger of PRHR is located in the in-containment refueling water 
storage tank (IRWST). The decay heat is transferred to the cooler water in the 
IRWST. The reactor coolant water in PRHR becomes cooler and denser and cools 
the core. The cycle continues until the water of the IRWST is depleted. Large 
amount of water is, however, stored in the IRWST. The decay heat is transferred to 
the water of IRWST in the containment vessel (CV) with PRHR and steam is gen-
erated. The IRWST is vented to the containment vessel and increase its pressure.
Passive Containment Cooling System
The passive containment cooling system (PCS) of AP 1000TM is shown in 
Fig. 12.10 [14].
Passive containment cooling water storage tank (PCCWST) is located in the 
roof structure of the containment building. The water will be dispersed via gravity 
to the top of the CV from PCCWST. The water film covers the steel surface of the 
CV. The airflow through the annulus removes the heat from the CV by evaporation 
of the water.
The outside air flows into the outer annulus from the inlet louvers. It flows 
down and flows up in the inner annulus between the CV wall and the air baffle. 
Evaporating water is applied to the top of the CV from PCCWST. The steam is 
exhausted through the chimney area to the atmosphere. PRHR heat exchanger 
Fig. 12.8  Passive pressure pulse transmitter [13]
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transfers decay heat to the in containment refueling water storage tank to the con-
tainment atmosphere. The steam is condensed by PCS operation and returned via 
gravity-drain gutters to the IRWST again.
Advanced Accumulator
An advanced accumulator (ACC) is a passive device leading to a discharge char-
acteristic of high and low flow rate using a vortex flow damper to cope with large 
break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) of a PWR [15–17]. High flow rate is 
required for the refill of RPV after large break LOCA, but low flow injection is 
necessary for reflooding of the core. The function was provided by an accumulator 
firstly and low head injection pump secondly in the current system. The switch-
ing off the systems is necessary. The new system of ACC operates at high flow 
rate firstly and low flow rate secondly by means of the vortex flow damper. It can 
eliminate the low head injection pumps and storage tank for safety injection of the 
present system.
A vortex chamber is provided at the bottom of accumulator tank as shown in 
Fig. 12.11. A standpipe is connected to the vortex chamber that is connected to 
the injection pipe. At high water level, water comes into both large and small flow 
pipes. Since the mass flow through the standpipe is large and is radially directed 
Fig. 12.9  Passive residual heat removal system (PRHR) [14]
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Fig. 12.10  Passive containment cooling system [14]. 1 Core, 2 PRHR, 3 IRWST, 4 Gutters, 5 
CV, 6 Louvers, 7 PCCWST, 8 Atmosphere
Fig. 12.11  Principle of advanced accumulator [17]. a Large flow rate (RV refilling). b Water 
levels in accumulator tank. c Small flow rate (core reflooding)
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to the vortex chamber, it dominates the injection mass flow at the outflow without 
forming a vortex in the vortex chamber. Consequently the coolant is injected at 
high flow rate. At low water level, water stops flowing into the standpipe. The flow 
from the small flow pipe connected circumferentially to the vortex chamber forms 
a strong vortex in the vortex chamber. The coolant is injected with small flow rate 
due to the vortex.
12.4.2.5  Actual Japanese NRA Requirements Related to Buildings, 
Systems and Components
Installation of permanent backup facilities designed as “specialized safety facility” 
is required as the measures against intentional air craft crashes, etc.
Measures are strengthened for fire protection and internal flooding which trig-
ger simultaneous loss of all safety function due to common cause.
Measures are required to prevent core damage even in the event of loss 
of safety functions due to the common cause. For example, a safety-relief 
valve(SRV) is opened by using mobile power sources to reduce the RPV pressure 
and water is injected using mobile water injection system.
Measures are required to prevent CV failures in the event of core damage. For 
example a filtered venting system is installed to reduce the pressure and tempera-
ture of CV and to remove radioactive materials. A system such as mobile pumps, 
hoses etc. are to be prepared to inject water into the lower part of the CV to pre-
vent its failure. It is shown in Fig. 12.12.
In order to suppress radioactive materials dispersion in the event of CV fail-
ure, deployment of outdoor water spray equipment is required to douse the 
reactor building and prevent a plume of radioactive materials contaminating the 
atmosphere.
Fig. 12.12  Measures to prevent containment vessel failure [3]
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12.4.3  Mitigation Measures Against Severe Accidents
12.4.3.1  Hydrogen Mitigation
Hydrogen and other flammable gases represent a key contributor to potential con-
tainment failure risk and therefore must be effectively eliminated. Reactor type 
as well as containment type, size and internal configuration and the selected melt 
mitigation strategy (in-vessel or ex-vessel molten corium cooling) are determining 
factors. Several provisions are generally available for mitigation of hydrogen risks, 
including containment venting, inerting, mixing, use of hydrogen igniters and pas-
sive autocatalytic recombiners (PAR).
After TMI-2 in 1979 attention was focused on the hydrogen produced by metal-
water reactions in a degraded core accident. As a consequence, certain types of 
non-inerted operating plants installed electrical powered igniter system to control 
hydrogen build-up under severe accidents to prevent potential detonations at aver-
age uniform concentrations greater than 10 %. Later on, a new, simpler device 
called the passive autocatalytic recombiner (PAR) was developed, which is now 
considered as an appropriate system for the future.
The principle and concept of a passive autocatalytic recombiner is shown 
in Fig. 12.13 [20]. The PAR has a metal housing with a gas inlet at the bottom 
and a lateral gas outlet at the top. Catalysts are arranged in the bottom part of the 
housing. Housing protects the catalyst from direct spraying of water and aerosol 
deposition. H2 molecules coming into contact with the catalytic surface react with 
ambient O2. Reaction between H2 and O2 is an exothermic process with high acti-
vation energy (600–650 °C). By the use of catalysts the energy can be reduced 
to ambient condition. Reaction heat (exothermic process) reduces density of gas. 
It induces buoyancy-driven flow through PAR. Natural convection is increased by 
the chimney effect of PAR housing. Hot gas/steam mixture leaves PAR at the top.
The hydrogen issue in a PWR dry containment can be solved by 20–40 PARs 
distributed inside the containment. With this measure, the global hydrogen concen-
tration can be limited to 10 vol. % and in case of deflagration the containment pres-
sure can be kept below the design pressure. Global detonation is prevented [19].
BWR containments generally are inerted by nitrogen. Therefore only a few 
PARs in the drywell and wetwell are required which are able to limit the oxygen 
(from radiolysis) concentration below the flammability limit of 5 vol. %.
Acting in combination with igniters or pre-inerting, PARs deplete hydrogen in 
non-inerted containment atmospheres and oxygen in inerted atmospheres, such 
that no detonations or uncontrolled burning takes place that could cause failure of 
safety-related structures or components.
12.4.3.2  Containment Venting Systems
Motivation and objectives for filtered containment venting systems are to decrease 
the containment pressure in severe accident sequences when energy and fission 
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products are released into the containment, if the pressure exceeds a specified limit 
(prevention of late containment failure) and to limit the level of releases into the 
environment via the atmosphere. Different principles for containment venting sys-
tems are available such as dry filter systems and scrubber systems.
Dry Filter Method
The dry filter method (DFM) is a venting system that consists of the combination 
of two types of filters.
A metal fiber filter that retains airborne radioactive aerosols (aerosol filter) and 
a molecular sieve with doped zeolite for chemisorption of gaseous radioactive ele-
mental iodine and its organic compounds (iodine filter).
Fig. 12.13  Passive 
autocatalytic recombiner 
(PAR)
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A droplet separator prevents water droplets from entering the filtered contain-
ment venting system (FCVS). The venting system can be actuated either remotely 
by opening containment isolation valves or by a rupture disc, depending on regula-
tory and/or customer requirements.
Scrubber System
This system is double-staged and uses the advantages of a high-speed venturi 
scrubber technology combined with highly efficient filter features. The system 
operates by passing the vented vapors from the containment atmosphere through 
a scrubber/filter vessel to remove high activity isotopes and aerosols to contain the 
radioactive releases. The filter unit is a wet scrubber system with chemical control. 
In the second cleaning stage, the micro-aerosol filter combination equipped with 
metal fibers helps to avoid significant long-term re-entrainment. The second part 
of the filter unit retains the aerosol particles that are usually too small for reten-
tion by any scrubber and droplet separation devices. A venturi scrubber is shown 
in Fig. 12.14 [20]. For both PWR and BWR dry filter or scrubber systems are 
installed in many nuclear power plants all over the world.
12.4.3.3  Melt Stabilization Measures
If a core in LWRs starts to melt and cannot be cooled within its original configura-
tion, fuel, cladding and core structures will form a core melt within the RPV. In 
order to prevent the failure of the RPV or the containment, cooling mechanisms 
Fig. 12.14  Venturi scrubber
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have to be implemented which will keep the core melt either within the RPV or 
within the containment. The stabilization and termination of the accident if it 
is successful with the coolability of the core melt in the bottom head is called 
In-Vessel melt Retention (IVR) and the same, if successful with the coolability of 
the melt on the concrete base mat or within a special coolable configuration (core 
catcher) is termed as ex-vessel melt retention.
In-Vessel Melt Retention
In-vessel melt retention (IVR) is the retention of core melt by thermally stabiliza-
tion in the reactor vessel by RPV outside cooling. The principle of this concept of 
IVR is depicted in Fig. 12.15. Specific requirements of IVR are:
•	 It must be activated manually or coupled to severe accident signal.
•	 Flooding must be completed before corium relocation into the lower vessel 
head.
•	 At any melt-contacted location internal heat fluxes must be lower than local 
CHF limits on the outside.
•	 Suitable two-phase flow conditions must be established.
•	 Suitable water reservoir and flooding strategy; preferred water level in the pit 
near hot leg level.
•	 Elevated water reservoir with sufficient volume to cover the grace period, (period 
of no operator action necessary) for the unavailability of active measures.
Fig. 12.15  Concept of in-vessel retention
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Issues related to thermal regime of IVR have been studied in detail with dedi-
cated experimental devices. The heat transfer distribution from a convective, 
volumetrically heated pool has been studied with facilities of various scale and 
geometry. The Rasplav [27] and MASCA [28] projects have employed real 
corium materials and thus played a significant role in confirming the applicabil-
ity of the results obtained with simulant materials. Even though the heat transfer 
distribution from a molten metallic layer is relatively well known, there is still 
some uncertainty attached to the thickness of the metallic layer, which ultimately 
determines the magnitude of the focusing effect. However, when attempting to 
apply IVR to reactor with higher power density, the focusing effect during inter-
mediate states becomes a major issue. Efforts are still needed for better under-
standing of the corium relocation process into the lower plenum, the formation of 
a molten pool there and the height of the metallic vs. oxidic layers as a function 
of time.
Ex-Vessel Melt Retention
Two PWR designs for which currently projects are under way rely on ex-vessel 
corium retention for the management and stabilization of corium within the con-
tainment: the EPRTM and the VVER 1000. In these designs it is considered that 
in-vessel retention cannot be proven for large power reactors in all severe accident 
scenarios, therefore dedicated core catchers have been designed that can gather the 
corium and cool it safely without violating the containment basemat. The principle 
of ex-vessel melt retention (EVR) is shown in Fig. 12.16. Specific requirements 
are:
•	 Suitable water reservoir and flooding strategy (longer lead time than for IVR).
•	 Sufficient cavity size/volume.
•	 Openings for pit flooding must be protected against melt ingress.
Ex-vessel retention and coolability are also considered in a flooded pit for BWR’s 
in Nordic Countries (Sweden, Finland) [25]. In these reactors, it is expected that 
after a vessel melt-through the corium will be fragmented in the flooded cavity and 
form a coolable debris bed.
Another proposal is the application of so called “EPRI concept” based on 
the provision of a certain spreading area for corium on the basemat and frag-
mentation of the melt through corium concrete interaction with water infiltra-
tion from above. It is assumed that this process will lead to a stable fragmented 
bed, which can be cooled and stabilized without penetration of the containment 
liner.
A concept was studied and tested by FZK (Research Center Karlsruhe), 
Germany, which relies on penetration of water through the melt from below which 
shall lead to a stable fragmented and coolable bed.
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The operational principle or ex-vessel melt retention (crucible) is core melt col-
lected and thermally stabilized within pit/cavity. It avoids most IVR-related con-
cerns thanks to the addition of sacrificial material, which influences chemistry, 
stratification and heat fluxes.
Core Catcher Concepts
The EPRTM melt retention (core catcher) concept
The scheme of the principle of the EPRTM core catcher concept is shown in 
Fig. 12.17. For the stabilization and long-term cooling of the molten core, the 
EPRTM relies on an ex-vessel strategy, which implies the spreading of the molten 
core on a large area with subsequent flooding and quenching. The resulting, high 
surface-to-volume ratio allows an effective cooling of the spread melt, even with-
out crediting superficial fragmentation [21].
Melt relocation into the core catcher is promoted by a preceding temporary retention 
of the melt in the pit, with the admixture of sacrificial concrete. This results in an 
accumulation and pre-conditioning and enhances the ability of the melt to spread.
The principles of the main sequences are as follows:
•	 Temporary melt retention to accumulate and condition the core debris in the pit 
by means of sacrificial material (step 1).
•	 Spreading in one event into the core catcher after penetration of the melt plug 
(step 2).
Fig. 12.16  Concept of ex-vessel retention
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•	 Triggering of flooding valves which activate gravity- driven water overflow 
from the IRWST, Quenching and passive cooling of the melt by the evaporation 
or heat- up of water.
A picture of EPRTM [7] IRWST, spreading room and core catcher is shown in 
Fig. 12.18. ATMEA, a 1000 MWe class PWR of Mitsubishi-AREVA also adopted 
this type of core catcher.
Fig. 12.17  Principle of the EPRTM core catcher concept
Fig. 12.18  EPRTMIRWST, 
spreading room and core 
catcher [7]
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The VVER 1000 crucible concept
The core catcher of VVER 1000, a crucible concept is discussed in [22]. External 
heat fluxes to side/bottom can be adjusted by amount and type of added sacrificial 
material. Thermal-chemical interactions are not of concern; stabilization solely based 
on cooling and crust formation. Concept is used in VVER-1000 in China and India.
The crucible-type catcher comprises: a water-cooled steel vessel, a container 
with sacrificial material under the reactor bottom plate. The vessel performs the 
function of the main corium-retention barrier. The vessel comprises a vertical lat-
eral part and a cone-shaped bottom with 12÷16º canting angle allowing the criti-
cal heat flux increase as compared to semi-elliptical or hemispherical bottom. The 
inner space of the vessel is sealed by a steel sheet preventing water penetration 
into the vessel prior to the molten corium relocation. Such a measure considerably 
reduces the probability of steam explosion. In a low probable case of a simultane-
ous water and corium relocation into the core catcher, the risk of steam explosion is 
reduced down to the negligible level by the honeycomb structure inside the catcher.
Other core melt stabilization concepts
European safety requirements are satisfied with limited modifications of the cur-
rent ABWR [23]. The ESBWR proposes a so-called BiMAC (Basemat-internal 
Melt Arrest Coolability) concept located below the reactor pressure vessel [24]. It 
is a core catcher combined with passive containment cooling.
EPRI requirement
The EPRI requirement is used for the melt spreading, flooding and quenching on 
concrete in USA. “EPRI criterion” [26] requires that a spreading area should be 
larger than 0.02 m2/MWth. Its function is based on water ingression and contin-
ued thermal cracking/fragmentation at the top. It is deduced from observations for 
volcanic magma flows. Its efficiency was first investigated for molten corium in 
the MACE/CCI test program at Argonne National Laboratory. The concept was 
developed for existing generation two (Gen-II) plants, but applied also in genera-
tion three (Gen-III) designs.
The basis for the “EPRI requirement” is as follows:
1. Decay heat considered to 1 % of thermal power
2. Removable “reference heat flux” from debris bed 1 MW/m2
3. Assumption of a “conservative design factor” of 0.5
Using these figures the following specific number can be generated:
Area/thermal power = 0.01/(0.5*1 MW/m2) = 0.02 m2/MWth.
12.4.3.4  Severe Accident Instrumentation
A severe accident instrumentation concept consists of the availability of appropriate 
instrumentation in order to (1) perform operator actions, (2) inform about the pro-
gression of the accident and survey the effectiveness of the mitigation process, (3) 
survey the overall plant conditions including possible releases to the environment.
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Instrumentation for Severe Accident Management
The essential parameters for severe accident (SA) management are shown in 
Table 12.2 for PWR and Table 12.3 for BWR.
Instrumentation for Containment Integrity
Important containment parameters relevant for severe accident management 
(SAM) strategy are combustible gas production (H2, CO) and information on radi-
oactivity content of aerosols, noble gases, iodine etc. The information is necessary 
Table 12.2  Essential 
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for defining venting strategy, capability to derive the damage state of the core and 
the radioactivity level in the containment.
Measurement of combustible gas (H2, CO) concentrations is necessary in order 
to get information about core degradation and location, and to succeed in miti-
gation measures. Containment pressure and containment temperature need to be 
measured to know pressure buildup in containment due to decay heat. Positions of 
core melt within the containment need to be known.
For identification of containment leak-tightness, measurement of specific 
parameters in adjacent compartments, for example, H2-concentration, pressure 
build-up etc. is necessary.
Post Accident Sampling System
A post-accident sampling system (PRONAS) has been developed and is described 
in [18]. The technical features are:
1. Analysis of containment gases: Aerosol bound radionuclides; Non-aerosol 
bound (gaseous) iodine isotopes, radioactive noble gases (Xenon & Krypton)
2. In situ sampling technology
3. No loss of accuracy in pipes
4. High dilution technology enabling easy handling of the samples
5. Gases are diluted in modules and discharged from a sampling box
6. In situ micro sampling based on capillary pipe technology which requires no 
containment penetration valves
7. Design basis and SA qualified hardware
8. Entire measuring equipment outside containment
9. Capability for oxygen monitoring (for BWR)
12.5  Summary
The lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident support safety enhance-
ments to cope with events that go beyond the design basis. Nevertheless the fun-
damental concepts of defense-in-depth still remain valid for nuclear safety. In case 
of higher uncertainties of external hazards, the effective implementation of the 
defense-in-depth requires additional means.
Concerning the structures, systems and components, technology and concepts 
exist which can cope with this type of accidents. With respect to severe accident 
mitigation, most of the technologies required to cope with Fukushima type acci-
dents is considered to be already available, too.
External hazards
From the technological point of view it has to be stated that every measure that 
needs to be installed to cope with stricter requirements for both earthquake and 
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tsunami hazards is available. This is explicitly demonstrated by the already started 
or even finished measures for the enforcement of the plants up to now.
The main issue for the enforcement of the plants is to find out the design require-
ments which have to be considered concerning the beyond design basis conditions.
Enforcement of structures, systems and components
The main issue of multi-unit sites is to identify weak points of individual units. 
They are considered to be as follows:
•	 Common cause failures that lead to the failure of safety related systems and/or 
components, and
•	 Connections among units that may affect intact structures, systems or compo-
nents from hazardous conditions of other units which consequently may lead to 
their failure
The PSA is considered to be the tool that enables to identify the areas which 
must be considered to strengthen the safety of multi-unit sites.
Since after an external event like an earthquake the offsite electricity supply 
is very difficult to guarantee, for such case the solution is mainly to use mobile 
equipment which is to be stored in the vicinity of the plant with the guarantee that 
it can be connected to the respective plugs at the plant under all circumstances. 
Only in cases where an offsite electricity source is very closely located to the plant 
site it can be considered to harden the source and the connection appropriately.
For the enforcement of onsite emergency energy supply many examples exist for 
bunkered systems, which were back-fitted and therefore are already provided for 
existing plants. So, the technology for such components is available; for example, 
diverse diesel generator systems with appropriate reliability for their function exist.
The main issue to strengthen the safety related structures, systems and compo-
nents (SSC) in case of extreme external events is as follows:
•	 enforce the design of existing SSCs
•	 add alternative and/or additional SSCs
•	 use bunkered solutions
•	 provide passive components which need no electricity supply
For all these measures the technology is available and there exist a number of exe-
cuted solutions for existing reactors. It is a matter of individual plant design what 
measure could be appropriate to strengthen existing SSCs considering also the 
impact on the economics effects of the plant.
Severe accident mitigation measures
The use of catalytic recombiner can be regarded as the most suitable hydrogen haz-
ard mitigation strategy for nuclear power plants in the future because of its passive 
behavior, its well-known physical phenomenology, its efficiency under both beyond-
design-basis and design-basis accident conditions, its start-up at low hydrogen con-
centration, and its simple use without supplementary constraints in normal operation.
All venting systems have passed a number of qualification tests and most of 
them were already installed in NPPs, meaning that they have successfully passed 
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a licensing process. Decisive criteria for the selection of one of the systems have 
to be defined by the respective utilities under consideration of their regulatory 
requirements.
For existing reactors the back-fitting of RPV outside cooling is a very complex 
and expensive measure, and may be only possible from the technical point of view 
for very limited applications. It is expected that in most cases for the cooling an 
active system must be provided. In such cases it is proposed to use such an addi-
tional active system to inject water into the vessel instead injecting it for outside 
cooling. For existing BWRs, the method proposed by the Nordic countries could 
be a solution if it is assured that the cavity around the RPV can be filled with water 
passively and the water tightness of the compartment can be maintained.
In other cases, the proposal considering melt concrete interaction could be a 
solution, which may lead to an extension of the time the melt can be contained 
within the containment boundaries or even will be stabilized within the contain-
ment. For both solutions further effort of research and development is required.
Core catchers are mainly proposed for Generation 3+ reactor systems. Up to 
now already some concepts have been successfully developed and licensed, such 
as those for the VVER and EPRTM reactors, and are implemented in ongoing 
projects.
Appropriate instrumentation qualified for severe accident conditions is one 
of the main prerequisites for an efficient severe accident management. In order 
to improve existing measures, it is required to consider this issue and implement 
severe accident related instrumentation for hydrogen monitoring or radioactivity 
monitoring. In addition the instrumentation that reliably indicates the state of the 
plant such as temperature, pressure and water level measurement have to be quali-
fied for severe accident conditions at elevated temperatures and radioactivity doses.
It should be noted that management, command and control of severe acci-
dent for reducing the socio-psychological impact is important, although it is not 
addressed in this chapter.
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